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THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
UNDER FIXED LABOR SUPPLY
Cristina Pita and Ramón Torregrosa
A B S T R A C T
Since 1950 Nash solution has been applied to solve most bargaining problems in the field
of Labor Economics. In the present paper we show that this solution might not be appropriate
under uncertainty over the state of nature and a fixed labor supply due to the non-fulfilment of
the concavity axiom. 
JEL classification: J50
Keywords: Nash bargaining solution, uncertainty.
 R E S U M E N
Desde 1950 la solución propuesta por Nash ha sido aplicada mecánicamente en la mayor
parte de los problemas de negociación que se plantean en Economía Laboral. En este trabajo
demostramos que la solución de Nash no debe utilizarse en aquellas situaciones en las que existe
un número de trabajadores fijo e incertidumbre sobre el estado de la naturaleza debido al
incumplimiento del, frecuentemente ignorado, axioma de concavidad. 
JEL clasificación: J50




Following Nash seminal work in 1950, Nash solution has been mechanically applied to
most problems that involve bargaining among economic agents. Although the theory of bargaining
has been enriched with further developments, new insights and solutions have not been broadly
adopted by other fields of economic theory or applied economics. This is particularly the case of
Labor Economics where, up to our knowledge, no other solution has been seriously considered
as a plausible alternative. In this paper, we intend to prove that Nash solution might not be
appropriate under all sorts of circumstances. In particular, it should not be used when the firm
bargains over wages with a fixed number of workers.
As it is well known in bargaining theory, Nash solution does not necessarily fulfil the
axiom of concavity (Thomson, 1994), which implies that the parties might not have an incentive
to reach an agreement and sign a contract as long as the bargaining set remains unknown. Thus,
we might encounter situations where the calculation of Nash solution is possible but, having the
concavity axiom not satisfied, this solution becomes meaningless because it would not be
implemented. 
The intuition supporting our story is straightforward. A firm and a union bargain over
wages in a right-to-manage setting. Depending on the wage and the (formerly revealed) state of
nature, the firm chooses the level of employment that maximizes its profits. Labor supply is
rationed in the sense that there exists a maximum amount of labor that the firm might hire. Within
this framework, a positive  demand shock would induce the firm to employ additional workers
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at the bargained wage. However, extra workers cannot be hired. Given that the wage rate has
been set during the bargaining process, neither the employment level nor the wage can be
increased. The union knows beforehand that a good state of nature will not report either a higher
wage or a larger level of employment -and thus an increase in workers  utility- but it will only lead
to an increase in the firm's rents. In this context, the union does not have an incentive to sign a
collective bargaining agreement in an uncertain environment. However, if labor supply was
perfectly elastic, the union could benefit from a good state of nature through an increase in the
number of workers employed and it would thus not reject to sign an employment contract based
on a previously bargained wage rate.U(n,w;￿)￿nw￿(1￿n)￿
       To keep this example as simple as possible, we assume risk-neutrality. The reader should be aware, however,
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that the main result does not depend on this assumption. In fact, we have also solved a similar model with risk-
averse workers and observed the non-fulfilment of the concavity axiom.
4
In terms of bargaining theory, a fixed labor supply means that the Pareto-optimal frontier
of the bargaining set becomes an isolated point that corresponds with the Nash solution. This
causes the non-fulfilment of the concavity axiom. Nash solution exists but cannot be implemented
because the parties are not willing to reach an agreement on wages while uncertainty remains
unsolved.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we display an example to illustrate the
main argument of the paper, devoting a subsection to the construction of the bargaining sets under
alternative demand shocks. Finally, the last section summarizes the conclusion.
II. A  SIMPLE  EXAMPLE
A firm signs state-contingent employment contracts with a group of risk-neutral  workers
2
(n). We assume that n￿n , where n  denotes the maximum amount of labor that the firm might 00
hire. For simplicity, we normalize n =1 and, therefore, n￿1. All workers are homogeneous and 0
affiliated to a single union. The reader may think of this situation as a bilateral monopoly where
the supply of labor is fixed for some reason (e.g., training new workers requires a long period of
time, a closed-shop arrangement prevails in the industry, etcetera..).
The parties objective functions
The union's utility function is,
where w denotes the wage that employed workers earn, and ￿ represents some sort of non-labor
income that unemployed workers receive (e.g., unemployment insurance provided by the state).f(n)￿n 1/2
￿n
1/2￿wn
      It would certainly be of much interest to explore the situation in which ￿ is partially determined during the
3
bargaining process. That is, a more realistic model would incorporate both unemployment insurance and the
severance payment provided by the firm to unemployed workers.
       When w=￿, a worker is indifferent between working at the firm or staying unemployed since effort does not
4
cause disutility in this model.
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For our purposes, ￿ is assumed exogenous to the bargaining process.  Obviously, w￿￿
34
(participation constraint); otherwise, workers would prefer to stay idle.
In this model, fixed costs are swept away in order to avoid unnecessary complexity.
Production exhibits decreasing returns to scale. For simplicity, let the production function be
Hence, the firm's objective function can be written as
where ￿ stands for the state of nature. The related literature offers alternative interpretations for
￿. Basically, ￿ is a random variable that might represent either a productivity shock or a demand
shock. In terms of the labor market, changes in ￿ lead to shifts of the labor demand function.
The time sequence is crucial. First, the firm and the union bargain over wages. Once the
wage is decided upon, the state of nature (￿) is revealed. Therefore, the bargaining set is uncertain
while bargaining takes place. Later both parties can observe ￿; thus, there is not asymmetric
information in this model. According to the wage and the state of nature, the firm unilaterally
decides the level of employment. 
Employment determination
As we consider a right-to-manage setting, the firm chooses the level of employment that
maximizes its profits, which is n(w,￿)￿ ￿2










s.t. S(￿) ￿ [(￿,U)/￿￿￿￿,U￿U ￿ ]







Since n￿1, w￿￿/2.  Labor demand is thus a decreasing and convex function of the wage rate.
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Both the profit and the (indirect) utility function can then be written, respectively, as,
The Nash solution
Once we have specified the parties' objective functions, we proceed to write down the
Nash maximand:
where ￿' and U' refer to the fall-back incomes of each party, respectively, when an agreement
over the wage rate is not reached. Since the model does not consider any type of fixed cost,
failure to agree on wages implies that n=0 and then ￿'=0. Regarding U', the only possible source
of alternative income rests on ￿, thus U'=U(￿)=￿. For practical reasons, we refer to U-U' as V.S(￿)￿[(￿,V)/V￿￿￿4￿










Let us now focus on the bargaining set, S(￿). In Nash static approach, all of the crucial
information about the bargaining process might be fully described by a utility possibility set which
represents the consequences in terms of utility of all posible outcomes, including agreement and
disagreement. In order to depict the bargaining set associated to our problem, we adopt a
methodology similar to Blair and Crawford (1984), that is, we represent the set V[￿]. Blair and
Crawford (1984) explain the peculiarities of the utility possibility set referring to the firm-union
bargaining. Within their framework, however, labor supply is perfectly elastic whereas in our
model the constraint on employment (n￿1) requires that we study in detail the construction of the
bargaining set. 
From the profit function given in (2), w=￿ /4￿. However, since w￿￿/2, ￿￿￿/2.  Plugging
2
w=￿ /4￿ into equation (3), we can rewrite S(￿) as
2
When the constraint on ￿ is nonbinding, the function V(￿) intersects the x-axis at ￿=￿ /4￿. In
2
this case, ￿￿2￿. On the contrary, if ￿>2￿ the bargaining set is truncated at ￿=￿/2. 
We can now proceed and study the Nash solution to our bargaining problem. In order to
do it, let us assume that .=1-.=1/2, that is, both parties have equal power. The optimization













The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the above problem (see Appendix A for further technical
details) imply that Nash solution is given by
F(￿)= 
Both the Nash solution and the bargaining set have been depicted in Figure 1. If ￿￿3￿
Nash solution corresponds to point b and the bargaining set is the sum of areas A and B. Nash
solution is Pareto optimal and tangent to the bargaining set. On the other hand, when ￿>3￿ Nash















































In what follows we prove that the concavity axiom does not necessarily hold under
uncertainty over the state of nature and a fixed labor supply. Thus, in our model an employment
contract based on a previously bargained wage would not be signed as long as the state of nature
remained unknown.
Let us first define concavity. For all ￿￿[0,1], Nash solution satisfies the axiom of concavity
if 
F(￿S+ ( 1 - ￿)S )￿￿F(S )+(1-￿)F(S ) 01 0 1
where F is a candidate solution. The fulfilment of this axiom guarantees that both agents benefit
from an early agreement.
For simplicity, let ￿ be a Bernoulli random variable with parameter ￿, such that P(￿ )=￿, 0
and P(￿ )=1-￿, where ￿ ￿3￿ and ￿ >3￿. The expected value of ￿ is ￿￿ +(1-￿)￿ , which might 10 1 0 1
obviously be higher or lower than 3￿. Let us first consider that E(￿)>3￿. Under these
circumstances,












































       Notice that the value that ￿  takes on does not matter at all.
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The first component of each vector represents the firm profits under alternative realizations of ￿;
thus, if the inequality holds for the first component, the firm is willing to sign the contract. On the
other hand, the second component indicates the union's attitude towards reaching an agreement
on the wage rate beforehand. Solving (5), we find that the firm signs the contract only if ￿ ￿3￿, 0
and the union signs when ￿ ￿3￿. Therefore, an agreement is reached on wages if and only if 0
￿ =3￿. 0
6
We must now proceed and analyze whether the concavity axiom holds for E(￿)<3￿. In this
case,
Thus, the fulfilment of concavity is guaranteed if
We can prove that (6) is inconsistent with ￿ >3￿.  Therefore, we have proved that the firm 1
7
and the union would reach an agreement if and only if they knew beforehand that ￿ =3￿, which 0
is incoherent with the assumption of an uncertain environment.
Let us now devote some time to provide an intuitive interpretation to our results. In









equal to 3￿ depends on the assumption that both parties have the same bargaining power (i.e.,
.=1/2). To prove this statement, let us go back to the optimization of the Nash maximand.
Optimization of (4) leads to the following first-order condition:
which yields this solution for the optimal wage,
that is, the wage is a function of the parties' relative bargaining power and the alternative income.
Notice that w does not depend on ￿. Assuming equal bargaining power for both parties (i.e.,
.=1/2), w=(3/2)￿. But w￿￿/2 implies that ￿￿2w. Thus, for w=(3/2)￿, ￿￿3￿. 
However, at this wage rate, w=(3/2)￿, the union clearly prefers ￿=3￿ than ￿<3￿. The
intuition is straightforward. The union has its preferences defined over both employment and
wages. In fact, it is easy to prove that the union's indifference curves over wages and employment
are negatively sloped and convex (i.e., dw/dn<0 and d w/dn ￿0), and union's utility, given
22
w=(3/2)￿, is highest when ￿=3￿. Therefore, the union would sign an employment contract based
on w=(3/2)￿ only if it knew that ￿=3￿, which is not feasible under uncertainty.
Figure 3 depicts the labor market. We have drawn three alternative labor supply curves:
w=￿ (the union does not have any power and, therefore, ￿ is the lowest wage that could be set
during the bargaining process), w=2￿ (the union has all the power and the resulting wage is
highest), and an intermediate situation where .=1/2 (i.e., both parties have equal bargaining
power) and w=(3/2)￿. With respect to labor demand, we face multiple possibilities depending on
the value that ￿ takes on. In Figure 3, we explore the equilibria for two different values of ￿: ￿=3￿
and ￿=4￿.  
We can see in Figure 3 that for .=1/2 and w=(3/2)￿ the labor market is in equilibrium if
￿￿3￿. Otherwise, for higher values of ￿, there would be an excess demand of labor. For instance,
let ￿ be equal to 4￿. In such a situation, the labor market would not reach an equilibrium. At the       As Thomson (1994) indicates, neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions fulfil the concavity
8
axiom. Imposing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in our model would have led us to an identical result in terms
of the non-fulfilment of the concavity axiom.
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ongoing wage w=(3/2)￿, there is clearly an excess demand of labor which cannot be corrected
through an increase in the wage rate.
Regarding the equilibria in the labor market, problems arise when ￿ takes on a value larger
than 3￿. With respect to the bargaining sets, problems also appear when ￿ takes on a high value
with respect to ￿. We basically face two types of situations. When ￿￿3￿ we can draw bargaining
sets à la Blair and Crawford. On the contrary, if ￿>3￿ the bargaining set is truncated. In
summary, in order to obtain nicely shaped utility possibility sets, labor supply must be perfectly
elastic; otherwise, when the state of nature is good, the Pareto frontier, P(S), shrinks and, beyond
some level of ￿, might become a single point which is the Nash solution. This leads to the non-
fulfilment of the concavity axiom.
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III. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
It was our main purpose to prove through a simple example that Nash bargaining solution
might not be the appropriate tool to solve certain theoretical models. In particular, we have
showed that Nash procedure fails in its implementation when the firm bargains over wages with
a fixed number of workers. In this case, due to the non-fulfilment of the concavity axiom, agents
do not sign a contract as long as the bargaining set remains unknown. Labor economists should
thus be more careful when applying Nash's method and keep in mind the axiomatic nature intrinsic
































The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimization problem:
are the following:
If ￿>0 (binding constraint), (10) and (8) imply that ￿=￿/2 and therefore V=￿/2-￿. On the other
hand, if ￿=0 (nonbinding constraint), (9) and (7) imply that







The first and the second inequalities in expression (6) hold respectively if
Hence, in terms of the probability associated to the worse state, ￿, the union is more reluctant to
reach an agreement than the firm, since it is more likely that the first inequality holds than the
second inequality. Figure 2 illustrates this result. We know that (￿ -3￿)￿ >0, but (￿ -9￿)￿ +18￿ 11 11
2
can be either positive or negative; what is certain is that it is lower than (￿ -3￿)￿ . If (￿ - 11 1


























Thus, for the fulfilment of concavity we need that
Assume that the contract is signed and (6) holds. Let us now prove that this is inconsistent
with our previous assumption, E(￿)<3￿. Substituting E(￿) by ￿￿ +(1-￿)￿ , E(￿)<3￿ implies that 01
Therefore, (13) and (14) imply
which means that 
Since ￿ <3￿, 0
which implies that ￿ <3￿. This contradicts our initial assumption: ￿ >3￿. 1117
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